e , a uniform structure) unless there is an obvious contextual cu

e., a uniform structure) unless there is an obvious contextual cue that signals a structural change or unless there are consistent gaps in the input for a given context. In the absence of strong contextual cues, a naïve learner runs the risk of overgeneralization rather than restricting generalization to the separate structures that are actually present but underspecified in the learner’s representations. Of course, it is not clear what is meant by an “obvious” contextual cue. As noted earlier, there are many highly salient cues that do not signal a relevant change in underlying structure, and there are changes in structure that are

not signaled by any contextual cue. Interestingly, this aspect of Problem 3—contextual ambiguity—appears to be treated in fundamentally different ways in the motor and cognitive domains. In the domain of motor development,

the consequences of failing to learn the underlying structure (e.g., JQ1 how to control posture, balance, and limb movement for locomotion) is catastrophic, generalization from one regime to the next (e.g., crawling to cruising to walking) is restricted, and the change of context is obvious (e.g., eye-height above the floor). In contrast, in the domain of cognitive development, the consequences of failing to learn the underlying structure (i.e., to not “understand” something) is minimal, generalization is ubiquitous, and a change selleck screening library of context is typically not obvious. Moreover, motor development requires extensive practice, and making inductive “leaps” can be quite risky (e.g., a small step down for an experienced crawler is much less dangerous than that same small step down for a naïve walker). In contrast, cognitive development typically does not rely on practice except by making predictions, and making selleck chemicals inductive “leaps” is essential to deal with the computational

explosion of information (i.e., Problem 2). The foregoing dichotomy between motor and cognitive development is certainly overstated, but it raises the possibility that there is a continuum of differences among domains of development along the three dimensions of (1) consequences of failure to learn a structure, (2) propensity to generalize, and (3) relevance of contextual cues. The foregoing sections lead us to consider some of the broader implications of the three major problems facing naïve learners—absence of reinforcement, informational overload, and contextual ambiguity. Presumably, those of us who study development in infants are interested in the mechanisms and process of developmental change. There are three fundamental ways of conceiving of this change: (1) continuous—without interruption or sudden change, (2) incremental—adding or building from previous states, and (3) progressive—improvement without regression. The classic view of developmental change is a discontinuous process (e.g., stage-like, see Piaget, 1952).

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